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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this matter is placed with the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(i), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as 
amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. This trial court did not abuse its discretion by award-
ing Defendant a lien against Plaintiff's residence based upon his 
contributions to, and improvements of that residence. The appro-
priate standard of review to be utilized herein is whether there 
was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in 
a substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly prepon-
derated against the findings, or such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Watson v. 
Watson, P.2d , 190 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44, (Utah App.1992), 
citing Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988). 
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in requir-
ing Plaintiff to repay Defendant for the maintenance payments he 
made on two rings, which were awarded to Plaintiff, during the 
pendency of this action. The appropriate standard of review is 
the abuse of discretion standard cited above. Further, the 
exceptions to the general rule concerning gifts and inheritances, 
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as set forth in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah, 1988) 
support Defendant's stance on this issue. 
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding 
that medical expenses incurred by Plaintiff during the pendency 
of the action were marital debts subject to distribution between 
the parties. Again, the abuse of discretion standard, as cited 
above, applies to this issue. 
4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by having 
each party be responsible for his or her own attorney fees where 
the trial court found that both parties contributed significantly 
to their inability to settle this matter. The standard to be 
applied in review of this issue is the financial need of the 
receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the 
reasonableness of fees. Crockett v. Crockett, P. 2d at , 
193 Utah Adv,. Rep. at 18, citing Bell v. 8e77, 810 P. 2d 489, 493 
(Utah App., 1991), and the abuse of discretion standard. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Defendant/Appellee submits to this court that §30-3-5(1), 
Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), is determinative of the 
issues presented in this case. That statute, in pertinent part 
states: 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the 
children, property debts or obligations, and parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed an action for divorce in the Third District 
Court. On January 16, 1991, the trial court bifurcated the pro-
ceedings and granted Plaintiff a decree of divorce. All finan-
cial issues were reserved for trial. Trial was held on July 31, 
1991 and August 6, 1991. A supplemental decree of divorce was 
entered as a result thereof, and Plaintiff appealed the supple-
mental findings of fact and supplemental decree of divorce. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Plaintiff filed for divorce seeking award equitable 
divison of joint property. Record, at 2-5. 
2. Defendant answered and placed several matters in issue, 
to wit: improvements to premarital property and joint property. 
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Record, at 8-10. 
3. A pretrial was scheduled for hearing on November 2f 
1989, before Commissioner Peuler. Record, at 20-22. 
4. Plaintiff, along with her financial declaration, filed 
an offer of settlement wherein she retained all of her premarital 
interests and all of the marital property with Defendant taking 
only that which he held prior to the marriage. Record at 19. 
5. The Commissioner recommended that the house be ap-
praised and equity split, Plaintiff to be awarded the boat, each 
party to be awarded one ring and split the debts equally. Record 
at 22. 
6. A pretrial was held before the trial judge on February 
1, 1990, and the record is silent concerning that pretrial. 
Record at 30. 
7. On July 18, 1990, Plaintiff was awarded the temporary 
use and possession of the boat in dispute at a hearing before 
Commissioner Peuler. Record at 67-68. Plaintiff sold this boat 
without the knowledge or consent of Defendant. Record at 145. 
8. On January 16, 1991, the trial judge bifurcated this 
matter. Plaintiff was granted a decree of divorce and all finan-
cial issues were reserved for trial. Record, at 88. 
9. On July 31, 1991, and August 6, 1991, trial was held on 
the issues of the interest claimed by Defendant in Plaintiff's 
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home; the interest claimed by Defendant in the boat; the entitle-
ment to two diamond rings; responsibility for outstanding medical 
bills relating to treatment of Plaintiff's jaw; responsibility 
for outstanding medical bill relating to Plaintiff's surgery in 
August, 1990; Plaintiff's claims for reimbursement for expenses 
for repairs to the boat; and reciprocal claims for attorney's 
fees. Record at 99 - 100, and 103-104. 
10. The court issued a memorandum decision on November 5, 
1991. Record at 103-112. (A copy of the memorandum decision is 
included herein at appendix "A"). 
12. A supplemental decree of divorce was signed and entered 
on January 21, 1992. Record at 174-176. (A copy of the supple-
mental findings of fact, conclusions at law and supplemental 
decree of divorce is included herein at appendix "A".) 
13. Pursuant to the supplemental decree, Defendant filed 
verification of payments on the two diamond rings from the date 
of separation on in an amount of $4,632.50. Record at 118. 
14. Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on or about Febru-
ary 11, 1992. Record at 178-179. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant reported the vast majority of the parties 
income during the years of the marriage and contributed finan-
cially and through his labor and skill to the improvement of 
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Plaintiff's house. It was equitable that Defendant receive some 
portion of that increased value and the trial court awarded him a 
lien in an amount of $4,000 against Plaintiff's house even though 
the debt on the house exceeded the market value. These improve-
ments increased the value of Plaintiff's house by $12,000. The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in making this award to 
Defendant. 
2. The trial court awarded Plaintiff the two diamond rings 
subject to her reimbursing Defendant for his documented payments 
on those rings from the date of the separation of the parties. 
Defendant was awarded a possessory lien on those rings for that 
amount. Defendant documented that he paid the sum of $4,632.50 
on those rings from the time the parties separated. Under exist-
ing case law and upon well settled legal principals, it was 
within the court's discretion to award Defendant for the contri-
butions he made in the enhancement, maintenance and protection of 
those rings. 
3. Defendant had injured Plaintiff's jaw about the time of 
the parties' separation. Defendant admitted and assumed full 
liability for the outstahding medical costs of treatment for that 
injury. Defendant agreed to continue carrying Plaintiff on his 
health insurance during the pendency of the action for the pur-
pose of continuing treatment for the jaw for a period of eighteen 
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months, the period of time Plaintiff indicated was required to 
ensure no further treatment was required. Defendant being ad-
vised of no further treatment being performed or required for the 
jaw and at the end of approximately twenty months terminated the 
insurance coverage for Plaintiff. Coincidental in time and 
without notice to or knowledge of Defendant, Plaintiff scheduled 
unrelated surgeries and incurred additional debts due to the lack 
of insurance. Since there were no orders on this matter, and the 
record was silent on the issue of insurance coverage for the 
Plaintiff, the trial court found that the debts for the surgery 
were marital debts and allocated them equally as between the 
parties. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in that 
finding and allocation. 
4. Plaintiff sought an award of attorney fees. Defendant 
testified that he thought each should pay their own fees. The 
court found that each party contributed significantly to the 
inability to settle and that neither party demonstrated a need 
for an award of attorney fees. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in so finding that each party should be responsible 
for his or her own fees. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. There was np abuse of discretion in the trial court's award 
to Defendant of an equitable 1ien in the Plaintiff's Residence. 
The trial court awarded the Defendant a four-thousand dollar 
equitable lien in Plaintiff's residence. Supplemental decree, 
1T2, Record at 175. This award was based upon the trial court's 
findings that 
"tdjuring the marriage, the home was repainted, re-
carpeted, the fireplace was removed and refinished, the 
basement was finished, including finishing of a bath-
room, cedar was installed in the closet, a banister was 
installed down the stairway, the backyard was completed 
and a cement patio was installed. Also, ceramic tile 
was installed in the entry and kitchen. Materials and 
outside labor cost approximately $6,000, most of which 
came from marital funds. The greater part of the labor 
was performed by the Defendant, and a small portion of 
the labor was hired, and Plaintiff and her two daugh-
ters were involved in the work. A reasonable value for 
all of the home improvements, at the time of comple-
tion, was $12,000. 
Supplemental Findings of Fact at U7, Record at 143. 
All of these improvements had been done in a relatively 
short period of time as the parties had married on July 19, 1986, 
and separated about mid-January, 1989. Supplemental Findings of 
Fact at 1T2, Record at 142. The finances of the parties were such 
that Defendant supplied the vast majority of money during the 
marriage. In 1986, Plaintiff sustained an operating loss of 
$3,800 and Defendant had some income, but not enough to justify 
the filing of a joint tax return, having just started employment. 
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Supplemental Findings of Fact at !5, Record at 143. In 1987, De-
fendant earned $26,500 with Plaintiff declaring income of $787, 
and the year 1988 showed Defendant to have earned $24,000 and 
Plaintiff reporting $4,200. Id. 
Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in divorce mat-
ters and in the adjustments of the financial interests of the 
parties thereto. Whitehead v. Whitehead, P.2d , 193 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah App. 1992), Crockett v. Crockett, P.2d 
, 193 Utah Adv. Rep 16, 17 (Utah App. 1992), and §30-3-5 Utah 
Code Annot. (1953, as amended). This court has indicated that it 
will "afford the trial court 'considerable latitude in adjusting 
financial and property interests, and its actions are entitled to 
a presumption of validity.'" Watson v. Watson, P.2d , 190 
Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44, (Utah App. 1992), citing Naranjo v. Naran-
jo, 751 P.2d 144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988). 
This court then, will make changes "in a trial court's 
property division determination in a divorce action 'only if 
there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law result-
ing in a substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity 
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.'" Id. 
Defendant respectfully asserts that none of these contingencies 
exists and that the distribution of the trial court should was a 
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proper application of the law supported by the evidence and was 
not an abuse of discretion. 
"fTJhe overriding consideration is that the ultimate divi-
sion be equitablet.}" Watson, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. at 45, (cita-
tions omitted). Defendant asserts that this division was equita-
ble based upon the record of his financial and personal labor 
contributions to the marriage and the Plaintiff's home improve-
ments. 
The Plaintiff has come before this court asserting that 
Defendant paid no rent, made none of the mortgage payments, and 
made no direct monetary contributions toward her home. 
Plaintiff's brief at 12-14. Yet Plaintiff admits in her brief 
that all materials were paid for from joint funds. Ibid, at 12. 
She further admitted during trial that Defendant made direct 
financial contributions to the household and expenses - approxi-
mately one-half of his paychecks and that he had, on at least one 
occasion actually made a mortgage payment.' Transcript at 58-60. 
As to Plaintiff's claims that Defendant paid her no rent, 
the transcript reveals that Plaintiff was married prior to the 
instant marriage and did not expect rent from her prior husband, 
and that she allowed Defendant to live with her without expecta-
tions of rent knowing that Defendant had no funds. Transcript at 
96-97. In fact, she denied that Defendant should have paid her 
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any rent. Id. 
Defendant testified that he surrendered his paychecks to 
Plaintiff. Transcript, 155-157, and 198-199. Defendant did this 
because he did not have a bank account due to his bankruptcy 
which occurred immediately prior to his moving in with Plaintiff. 
Id. He did receive some of those funds back for pocket money, 
but he also had no bills or obligations to pay' due to the prior 
bankruptcy. Id. 
Further Defendant provided the labor and knowledge in com-
pleting the extensive remodeling of the house. Transcript at 
175-179. The expertise he supplied was learned from experience 
in building houses in the past. Id. 
The trial court found the reasonable value for all of the 
home improvements to have been $12,000. Supplemental Findings of 
Fact, 1T7, Record at 143. The trial court further found that even 
though there has been depreciation of the home over the past 
several years, the improvements added value to the property. Id 
(emphasis added). 
The incomes of the parties during the period of time they 
were together was also reviewed by the court. See, Supplemental 
Findings of Fact 1T1T4-5, Record at 143. The vast majority of 
declared income came from the Defendant and Plaintiff all but 
admitted this fact indicating that the tax documents which were 
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admitted as evidence spoke for themselves and that one might 
reasonably well inquire as to how Plaintiff could have made the 
house payments in the range of $600 per month, yet alone paying 
for the improvements. Transcript at 141-142, and 198-199. 
Defendant has not been able to raise any Utah cases which 
square directly with the issue of division of the value of im-
provements to real property in light of decreasing market values 
and the lack of present equity in the real property. Therefore 
Defendant is required to argue by analogy and compare the instant 
case to other cases setting forth general principles of equity. 
Watson, and Roberts v. Roberts, P. 2d , 188 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26 (Utah App. 1992) are recent cases from this court which 
can instruct and lead us on this issue. Watson involved the 
issues of corporate property and premarital property being award-
ed under the trial court's equitable powers in a divorce. 
Mr. Wilson was an employee of his own solely owned corpora-
tion and the corporation held title to a BMW automobile. Watson 
P. 2d at , 190 Utah Adv. Rep. at 44-45. This court held 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting 
aside the corporate entity under the alter ego doctrine and 
awarding Mrs. Watson that BMW automobile in light of the facts 
that Mrs. Watson had been the principal operator of that car and 
that Mr. Watson was awarded the other three automobiles held by 
15 
those parties. Watson P. 2d at , 190 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
45. In fact, it would have been inequitable had the trial court 
done otherwise. Id. 
In addressing the issue of premarital property in Watson, 
this court, citing Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 133, 135 (Utah, 
1987), stated 
"In appropriate circumstances, one spouse may be 
awarded property which the other spouse brought in to 
the marriage. The rationale behind this exception to 
the general rule is that '{mjarital property 'encom-
passes all of the assets of every nature possessed by 
the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source 
derived, ... and that the trial court may, in the 
exercise of its broad discretion, divide the property 
equitably regardless of its source or time of acquisi-
tion. 
Watson, P. 2d at , 190 Utah Adv. Rep. at 45, (citations 
omitted). This court went on indicating that it has "held that 
in dividing property between parties in a divorce action, '°t"he 
overriding consideration is that the ultimate division be equita-
ble0."" Id, (citations omitted). 
The property in question in Watson consisted of household 
goods, tools and an interest in a trailer. Id. The trial court 
took into consideration the award of other premarital property of 
Mrs. Watson to Mr. Watson in making its distribution, and this 
court upheld that equitable distribution. 
Applying the principles of Watson to the instant case indi-
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cates that the trial court's distribution was proper and should 
be upheld. Defendant made extensive personal and cash contribu-
tions to the household and to the improvement of the house it-
self. Transcript at 55, 58-60, 155-157, 175-179, and 198-199, 
and Supplemental Findings of Fact 1F7, Record at 143-144. The 
reported monetary contributions were mainly from the Defendant. 
Transcript 134-136, 141-142, and Supplemental Findings of Fact 
1HT5-6, Record at 143. There were few other assets of the mar-
riage to be distributed end those other assets were awarded to 
Plaintiff. Supplemental Findings of Fact 1F1M, and 8-10, Record 
at 142, and 144-146. Hence it would have been inequitable to 
grant Defendant nothing from the marriage or from the contribu-
tions he made to the house during that marriage. 
Roberts involved the assignment of assets and liabilities of 
the marital estate which resulted in a disparity as between the 
parties, particularly assignment of debts involving the property 
in the marital estate. Roberts, P. 2d at , 188 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 29. In holding that the trial court was well within the 
limits this court indicated that one should take "the value of 
all the parties' assets and liabilities as a whole—". Id. 
In the instant case, the trial court had before it the 
entirety of the parties assets and liabilities. It gave Defend-
ant an equitable lien in an amount of one-third of the value the 
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court placed on the improvements to the house knowing that Plain-
tiff had a liability on that house. Supplemental Findings of 
Fact, 1T7. The parties liabilities were divided equitably, as 
they were in Roberts. 
Davis v. Davis, 655 P. 2d 672 (Utah, 1982) and Stephens v. 
Stephens, 728 P. 2d 991 (Utah, 1986), are two slightly older 
cases which approach the issues of the instant case. Both in-
volve improvements to a home and an award of equity in the home 
for those improvements. 
Davis involved a home owned by Mrs. Davis from before the 
marriage to Mr. Davis. Davis, 655 P. 2d at 672. The parties 
made substantial improvements to the home. Id. Also, Mr. Davis 
held real property in New Mexico, which was purchased before the 
marriage and three-quarters of the purchase price was paid before 
the marriage. Davis, 655 P. 2d at 673. The trial court found 
that the home had increased in equity during the marriage, and 
would probably continue to increase in equity after the divorce. 
Id. The trial court awarded Mr. Davis a portion of the existing 
and future equities in the home. Id. Mrs. Davis was awarded a 
portion of the value of the land in New Mexico. Id. 
The Utah Supreme court affirmed the trial court's division 
of the property. Id. It based that affirmation upon the numer-
ous contributions to the respective properties made by the par-
18 
ties. Id. 
Applying Davis to the instant matter, and under the facts of 
the instant case, it is clear that the Defendant herein contrib-
uted to the increased value of Plaintiff's home. As in Davis, 
the Defendant in this case should be awarded something from his 
investments and the allocation by the court below should be 
affirmed. 
Stephens involved an order requiring that Plaintiff pay one-
half of the costs of capital improvements to the home. Stephens, 
758 P. 2d at 993. The Utah Supreme Court held that the trial 
court "was well within its discretion to require plaintiff to 
assume part of the burden of capital improvement expenditures. 
Defendant, on her limited income, could ill afford to shoulder 
alone all improvements, and the benefits to plaintiff upon the 
sale of the home are too obvious to merit further discussion." 
Id. Just as in Stephens, Plaintiff herein, on her limited income 
could ill afford to shoulder alone all of the improvements and 
would reap the benefits of those improvements. 
Plaintiff has cited and analyzed Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P. 
2d 338, (Utah, 1980), in support of her proposition that the 
trial court had acted contrary to equitable principals in award-
ing Defendant the lien on the home. Plaintiff's brief at 13-14. 
Jackson involved an appeal from the distribution of assets and 
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liabilities to one party. The other party sought an award of the 
entire equity in the home and certain other property free and 
clear of liens and encumbrances. The Court, in upholding the 
trial court's distribution, indicated that where a party is 
required to pay all debts on property, with the debts exceeding 
the value, it is fair that said party should also receive the 
majority of the property. 
Jackson indicates that the majority of the property should 
go with the liabilities. It does not indicate that all of the 
property must go with the debts, nor does it prohibit a different 
allocation. 
In the instant case, Defendant made substantial contribu-
tions toward the improvements of the home of the Plaintiff. He 
cannot take those improvements out of the home without further 
impairing the value of the home or of the improvements them-
selves. The trial court awarded Defendant only a portion of the 
value of the improvements, nothing more. 
Defendant made contributions which increased the value of 
the home. Supplemental Findings of Fact, f7, Record at 144. Had 
those improvements not been made, the disparity between the 
mortgage and market price would have been worse, and Plaintiff 
will be the one who is the recipient of value of the improvements 
in any event. The lien granted by the trial court was well 
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within its bounds of discretion and this court should affirm the 
trial court's findings on this issue. 
II. The trial court's award of the rings to Plaintiff subject to 
a possessory 1ien in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff for 
the amounts Defendant paid for those rings since the parties' 
separation is appropriate and equitable under control ling law. 
On or about September 26, 1987, Defendant purchased two 
ladies' rings from Morgan Jewelers and incurred charges on his 
own account in the total amount of $4,327.03. Supplemental 
Findings of Fact 1T10. There was dispute at trial as to whether 
this purchase was for investment purposes, as claimed by Defend-
ant, or as a gift as claimed by Plaintiff. The trial court found 
that shortly before Christmas, 1987, Defendant gifted those two 
rings to Plaintiff. Id. When the parties separated in mid-
January, 1989, Defendant was still paying on those rings, as he 
continued to do through the date of trial of this matter. Sup-
plemental Findings of Fact §10, and Transcript 173-174. The 
trial court awarded the rings to Plaintiff "subject to her repay-
ing the Defendant for all documented payments he made on the 
rings after the separation in Mid-January, 1989." Id. Further, 
the trial court found that "Defendant may continue to hold a 
possessory lien on the rings until all amounts provided herein 
21 
are fully satisfied." Id. 
Plaintiff asserts in her brief that the court abused its 
discretion in requiring Plaintiff to pay for these rings which 
the court found were sifted to her by Defendant. This assertion 
is erroneous. The trial court found that Plaintiff should repay 
Defendant for "all documented payments he made on the rings after 
the separation in Mid-January, 1989." Supplemental Findings of 
Fact 1F10. The trial court issued an order based upon this find-
ing. Supplemental Decree of Divorce, U4. 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah, 1988), discusses 
the issue of allocation of gifts in a divorce setting. That case 
sets forth the general rule that property acquired by one spouse 
by way of gift or inheritance should be awarded to that spouse. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. That general rule still is recog-
nized. See, Watson, P. 2d at , 190 Utah Adv. Rep. at 45. 
There are exceptions to that general rule. See Watson as 
discussed in Section I, supra. Mortensen itself enumerates two 
exceptions: 
"(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or 
expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or 
protection of that property, thereby acquiring an 
equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been 
consumed or its identity lost through commingling or 
exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift 
of an interest therein to the other spouse." 
Mortensen, 760 P. 2d at 308. (It should be noted that Defendant 
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has closely reviewed page 308 of that opinion, which is cited by 
Plaintiff in her brief and nowhere are these exceptions set forth 
as quoted by Plaintiff in her brief at page 15. The words "by 
his or her efforts or expense" were omitted by Plaintiff when she 
put forward this section of the citation in quotations in her 
brief.) 
Plaintiff makes the bald assertion that the exceptions 
noted in Mortensen do not apply in the instant case. Plaintiff, 
in sole support of that assertion cites only the fact that the 
court found that there was a gift. Defendant respectfully sug-
gests that the Mortensen exceptions do apply in the instant 
matter, particularly exception number one. 
At trial, Plaintiff admitted that Defendant purchased the 
rings in his name. Transcript, at 120. Defendant also admits 
that she made only one payment on that account. Id. Yet Defend-
ant is the one who has maintained payments on that account so as 
to avoid repossession or loss of the rings. Defendant documented 
payments of $4,632.50 on those rings since the separation of the 
parties. Record at 118. In other words, Defendant, has by his 
efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, 
or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable 
interest in those rings. See, Mortensen, 760 P. 2d at 308. 
Defendant did maintain and protect these rings. In fact, 
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Plaintiff was fearful that the rings could have been lost due to 
nonpayment. Transcript at 80. This fear of Plaintiff's then 
tacitly admits that Defendant did maintain these rings and pro-
tect them in order to keep them safely within the marital estate. 
Based on this, Plaintiff is admitting that the first exception 
set forth in Mortensen was met. Therefore the trial court's 
requirement of repayment of the contribution made by Defendant is 
just and equitable. 
On this issue, Plaintiff also asserts that she should take 
the rings free and clear of the contributions made by Defendant 
because he has kept the rings in his possession. Defendant 
asserts that this action of his, keeping the rings in his posses-
sion, again proves that he, through his efforts maintained and 
protected that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest 
in them. The record clearly shows that Plaintiff, upon acquiring 
the only other major asset in dispute, a 1973 Reinell boat, sold 
that boat without notice to and without the consent of the De-
fendant at a sale that was a questionable arms-length transac-
tion. Supplemental Findings of Fact fl9, Record at 145. That 
action of Plaintiff was a knowing alienation of a marital asset 
which was in dispute. It was done in disregard to the pending 
litigation and claims of Defendant therein. 
Plaintiff's assertions on appeal contradict her position at 
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trial as illustrated by her testimony at trial. Plaintiff claims 
in her brief that the court is taking the gift and requiring her 
to pay for it. Yet her own testimony was that she was willing to 
take over the payments. Transcript at 80. If she was willing to 
take over the payments, then she was willing to do that which she 
is now complaining that the court is requiring her to do — to 
pay for her gift. 
In light of Plaintiff's testimony, and her alienation of 
property of the estate, it is estimably equitable for Plaintiff 
to pay Defendant for his documented payments on the rings. She 
admitted that she was willing to do so, and with the debt being 
in Defendant's name, the reimbursement of moneys paid guarantees 
the maintenance and preservation of the property. 
Finally on this issue, Plaintiff asserts that somehow the 
trial court erred in not valuing the property at the time of 
divorce. Plaintiff's brief at 16. From Defendant's review of 
the record and transcript, the issue of the value of these rings 
was never raised at the trial court level. The parties never 
disputed the value. The only disputes set before the trial court 
regarding this issue were the award of these rings, the assign-
ment of the remaining debt thereon, and Defendant's claim of an 
interest due to his maintenance and preservation of this particu-
lar asset of the marriage. 
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The apportionment of the rings and the debt thereon was well 
within the discretion of the trial court and equitable in the 
circumstances. This court should affirm the trial court on this 
issue. 
III. The trial court's allocation of the medical expenses in-
curred by Plaintiff during the period between the date of the 
parties' separation and date of trial was proper. 
At trial, another of the issues raised by Plaintiff was the 
assignment of responsibility for outstanding medical bills for 
surgical services to Plaintiff during August, 1990. Supplemental 
Findings of Fact 1F1, Record at 142. This issue was hotly debated 
before the trial court as there were claims and counterclaims. 
Yet it must be noted that there were no controlling temporary 
orders concerning health care coverage for Plaintiff despite 
Plaintiff's testimony that she had raised this issue at a pretri-
al conference on February 1, 1990, before the trial judge. 
Supplemental Findings of Fact fl12, Record at 147. With this 
testimony before it, the trial court found that the minute entry 
from the mentioned pretrial conference did not reflect any de-
tails of that conference, no request for an order was made and 
no order was entered by the trial court on this issue. Id. 
Record at 30. 
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The basis of the dispute on this issue is the content and 
extent of an oral agreement between the parties at the time of 
the above-mentioned pretrial. Defendant had, on or about January 
14, 1989, hit Plaintiff in the jaw causing a fracture. Supple-
mental Findings of Fact 1M1 , and Transcript, at 157. Defendant 
acknowledged financial responsibility for medical treatment of 
the fracture. Supplemental Findings of Fact f11 and Transcript, 
at 158. 
At the time of the February 1, 1990, pretrial, Plaintiff had 
learned that Defendant had terminated the insurance and that 
Plaintiff had instructed her counsel to have Defendant continue 
health insurance coverage during the pendency of the divorce 
action. Transcript, at 82-84. There was discussion on this 
matter and the insurance was reinstated by Defendant based upon 
representations that the insurance was necessary solely for the 
purpose of covering any additional treatment needed for the 
fractured jaw and that the coverage was needed for only a period 
of eighteen months from the date of injury, January 14, 1989. 
Transcript, at 158-159, and 184-187. The transcript does not 
reflect that Plaintiff disputed these representations as condi-
tions for the insurance. 
Plaintiff's surgery occurred on August 15, 1990, and con-
sisted of correction of a deviated septum and a ventral hernia. 
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Supplemental Findings of Fact 1M2, and Transcript, at 38, 45-46. 
These surgeries were admitted by Plaintiff counsel to have been 
for conditions not related to the jaw fracture. Transcript, at 
45. In fact, there had been no claims for treatment of the jaw 
fracture since February, 1989, nor notice that further treatment 
of that fracture was required or anticipated. Transcript, at 35-
36. 
The two surgeries required pre-authorization by the insur-
ance carrier and coverage at the time of service. Transcript, at 
46. Plaintiff did not check to ensure that the insurance cover-
age was in effect at the time of the surgeries despite knowing 
that it had to be in place when the service was rendered and 
having knowledge that at one time prior to this time Defendant 
had terminated her coverage. Transcript, at 124-126. She simply 
went forward with the surgeries. 
Defendant did terminate the insurance, pursuant to his 
understanding of the agreement of the parties. Transcript, at 
164, and 186-187. He had no knowledge of the pending surgeries 
when he terminated the insurance. Id. 
The trial court, having all of this testimony before it, and 
being in the unique situation of being able to assess the wit-
nesses credibility, found that these obligations should "be 
treated as any other marital obligation." Supplemental Findings 
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of Fact f12„ As argued hereinabove on the other issues raised, 
the trial court is granted broad discretion in adjusting the 
financial , interests of a party and that discretion will be pre-
sumed correct by this court absent "manifest injustice or inequi-
ty that indicates a clear abuse of ... discretion." Crockett, 
P. 2d at , 193 Utah- Adv. Rep. at 18, Whitehead, P. 2d 
at , 193 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9. See also, Mortensen, 760 P. 2d 
at305-306, Roberts, P. 2d at , 188 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29, 
and Watson, P. 2d at , 190 Utah Adv. Rep. at 46. 
Hence the trial court's finding in the instant case should 
remain undisturbed. Defendant, in his testimony, denied knowl-
edge of the pending surgeries. Plaintiff did not refute that 
denial at trial. Further, Defendant did everything he could to 
attempt reinstatement of benefits with retroactive coverage. 
Transcript, at 164-165. 
The allocation of this particular debt includes in it, costs 
and fees assessed against the parties for any collection action. 
Supplemental Findings of Fact 1F12. Yet Plaintiff is the party 
who allowed this debt to go to collection, to default in fact, 
before doing anything to mitigate the damages. Transcript, at 
122-124. 
The court found no agreement of the parties, despite Plain-
tiff's claims of prior problems during the pendency of the ac-
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tion. No orders were entered on this issue despite Plaintiff's 
testimony that she discussed the need for the insurance with her 
counsel well before this incident. Defendant had no knowledge of 
these surgeries and carried out the agreement as he understood 
it. Plaintiff allowed the bills to go to default before taking 
steps to mitigate damages, and Defendant did what he could to 
reinstate the coverage making it retroactive. 
Based upon these facts, the court made its finding that this 
debt "be treated as any other marital obligation." Plaintiff has 
not shown any maniffest injustice or inequity indicating a clear 
abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding. That finding 
is reasonable and should be affirmed by this court. 
IV. The trial court's al location of attorney fees and costs is 
reasonable and proper based upon the ability of the parties to 
pay and their demonstrated need for an award of attorney fees. 
Under § 30-3-3 Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), the 
trial court has discretion to award costs and attorney fees in 
divorce proceedings. "The trial court must base its decision to 
award attorney fees upon evidence of the financial need of the 
receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the 
reasonableness of fees." Crockett, P. 2d at , 193 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 18, citing 0e77 v. 8e77, 810 P. 2d 489, 493 (Utah 
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App., 1991), and see, Whitehead, P. 2d at , 193 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 11, Roberts, P. 2d at , 188 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29, 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P. 2d 1380, 1384 (Utah, 1980), and Munns v. 
Munns, 790 P. 2d 116, 122-123 (Utah App., 1990). The decision to 
award attorney fees lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Id. The standard to be applied here is again the abuse of 
discretion standard. Id. 
The trial court in this matter found that Plaintiff had a 
monthly income of approximately $1,550 and Defendant had a month-
ly income of $1,793. Supplemental Findings of Fact !T13. Plain-
tiff admitted that the parties' earned incomes were pretty much 
the same. Transcript, at 90. Based thereon, the trial court 
found that neither party demonstrated a need for an award of 
attorney fees. Id. 
The trial court further found that both parties contributed 
to the inability to settle. Id. Plaintiff admitted that she 
would have settled on almost all issues up to the point in time 
when the surgery and medical insurance problem arose. 
Plaintiff's brief at 19. Transcript, at 91. The reasonable 
inference from this is that there was some issue upon which she 
was not willing to settle prior to this time. 
The fact is that the trial court questioned Plaintiff about 
her willingness to settle. Transcript, at 142-143. Plaintiff 
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clearly indicated that as of the November 2, 1989, pretrial 
before Commissioner Peuler that she was not willing to accept the 
recommendations because Defendant was awarded one of the rings. 
Transcript, at 143. 
The essence of that recommendation was that the home was to 
be appraised and any equity divided, Plaintiff was to be awarded 
the boat, each party awarded one ring and the debts to be divided 
equally. Id.. This means that Defendant would have been awarded 
only one ring, as the situation of the equity in the home would 
have been essentially the same, if not worse than it was at time 
of trial. It also must be remembered that the only debt of the 
parties was that debt remaining on the rings, as the insurance 
incident had not yet occurred. Defendant was willing to accept 
this recommendation of the Commissioner and settle the case. 
Transcript, at 180. Defendant had attempted settlement a number 
of times. Transcript, at 200. 
In other words, as the court so found, Plaintiff wanted 
everything. Transcript, at 13. See also, Plaintiff's offer of 
settlement, dated October 9, 1989, Record at 19. Defendant 
wanted something from the marriage, and was awarded some inter-
ests in the financial aspects of the marital estate. 
In light of the finances of the parties, with the Defendant 
making some funds in 1986, earning $26,500 in 1987, earning 
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$24,000 in 1988, while Plaintiff had an operating loss of $3,800, 
and reported incomes of $787 and $4,200 respectively, with the 
parties having paid out $6,000 for home improvements, which 
improvements had a total value of $12,000, and Defendant having 
carried the payments on the rings, in an amount of $4,632*50, 
during the pendency of the action, Defendant was certainly justi-
fied in expecting to retain something from the marriage. 
Throughout, Plaintiff has demanded all of the assets, and only 
grudgingly indicated willingness to accept responsibility for the 
liabilities of the marital estate. This inflexible attitude 
significant!/ added to the impossibility of settlement. 
Plaintiff's coercive tactics of demanding everything and 
then, when Defendant disputes it, crying out in the name of 
equity for an award of attorney fees is inequitable in itself. 
Equity requires a review of all assets and liabilities and an 
equitable distribution based thereon. Defendant was faced with 
only two options, surrender everything or go to trial. 
The insurance incident did occur. But it was the Plaintiff 
who steadfastly indicated that the insurance incident closed all 
likelihood of settlement. Nowhere in the record does Plaintiff 
ever indicate that she would have settled after that incident, 
because she would not have. 
It was Plaintiff's position then, as it is now, that she 
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should receive everything from the marriage. There was no com-
promise that was acceptable to Plaintiff. In order to preserve 
his claims and interests, Defendant has had no choice but to 
litigate the matter and defend his interests upon appeal. 
Plaintiff's take all attitude, and wanting to charge Defend-
ant with attorney fees for his good faith attempts to challenge 
that attitude contributed significantly to the necessity for 
trial. Based thereon, it would be grossly inequitable to require 
Defendant to pay anything toward Plaintiff's attorney fees and 
costs. 
There has been no showing that the trial court abused its 
discretion in its award. The trial court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
This trial court did not abuse its discretion in any of its 
findings and order. All of the trial court's findings were well 
grounded in fact and based upon solid precedent and legal princi-
pals. The trial court's findings and decisions on all issues 
raised in this case should be affirmed. 
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Respectfully submitted this 5^ day of September, 1992 
^ DAVID R. HARTWIG, ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
On this 0 day of September, 1992, four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was hand-delivered, to: 
Craig M. Peterson 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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APPENDIX "A" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNNETTE MANSKE TORRES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN MARTIN TORRES, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 894902184 
The trial herein commenced July 31, 1991 and concluded 
August 6, 1991. Witnesses were sworn and testified. A large 
number of exhibits were offered and were received. 
At a scheduling conference herein on January 16, 1991 the 
issues were bifurcated. Plaintiff was granted a divorce, which 
was entered by the Court February 4, 1991. All other issues 
were reserved for trial. 
Issues remaining for disposition at trial, were: 
1. Interest claimed by defendant in plaintiff's home; 
2. Interest claimed by defendant in 1973 Reinell boat; 
3. The entitlement to two diamond rings; 
4. Responsibility for outstanding medical bills of $65.75 
relating to treatment of plaintiff's jaw; 
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5. Responsibility for outstanding medical bills relating 
to plaintiff's surgery in August 1990; 
6. Plaintiff's claim for reimbursement for expenses 
incurred for boat repairs; and 
7. Reciprocal claim for attorney's fees. 
The Court has considered the testimony and evaluated the 
exhibits. Based thereon, the Court makes the following 
findings and rulings: 
1. The parties were married July 19, 1986. They lived 
together for approximately three months prior thereto. They 
separated around mid-January 1989. This divorce case was filed 
June 16, 1989. 
2. Defendant was divorced from his prior wife in June 
1986. Defendant's business had failed and he was winding up 
his business prior to this time. He had problems with the 
Internal Revenue Service, and they had executed on everything 
of value. He had gone through bankruptcy during 1985. 
2. Plaintiff was living in her own home with her 
daughters from a prior marriage when her relationship commenced 
with defendant. She was a self-employed cosmetologist. 
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3. The parties did not file a joint tax return for the 
year 1986, the year of the marriage. Plaintiff sustained an 
operating loss of approximately $3,800.00 in her business for 
that year. Defendant started employment for C.R. England & Son 
sometime around that time, but apparently did not have 
sufficient earnings to justify the filing of a joint tax return 
and the use of the net operating loss for tax purposes. 
4. In 1987, defendant brought in earnings of 
approximately $26,500.00, while plaintiff reported $787.00 
income from her business. Defendant earned approximately 
$24,000.00 in 1988, while plaintiff earned approximately 
$4,200.00 from her business. Joint returns were not filed in 
1989, and plaintiff had net earned income from her business for 
that year of approximately $8,800.00. 
5. Plaintiff purchased the twin home at 3773 South 352 
West, West Valley City, in which defendant claims an interest 
in these proceedings, in 1982 for approximately $52,000.00. As 
of May 13, 1991, the value thereof was appraised at 
$37,000.00. It has a current mortgage thereon of approximately 
$47,000.00. During the marriage, the home was repainted, 
recarpeted, the fireplace was removed and refinished, the 
basement was finished, including finishing a bath, cedar was 
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installed in the closet, a banister was installed down the 
stairway, the back yard was completed and a cement patio was 
installed. Also, ceramic tile was installed in the entry and 
kitchen. The materials and outside labor cost approximately 
$6,000.00, most of which came from marital funds. The greater 
part of the labor was performed by defendant, though a small 
portion of the labor was hired, and plaintiff and her two 
daughters were involved in the work. A reasonable value for 
all of the home improvements, at the time of completion, was 
$12,000.00. Even though the home had depreciated over the past 
several years, the improvements added value to the property. 
It would be reasonable for defendant to be awarded $4,000.00 as 
the reasonable value of his contributions thereto. 
6. Plaintiff purchased a 22-1/2 foot 1973 Reinell boat 
from Bruce Green on July 2, 1986. She paid $4,500.00 down from 
her own funds, and borrowed the balance from First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A. Defendant claims he contributed 
approximately $1,200.00 to the purchase price through work he 
performed on a Bayliner boat owned by Mike Peterson which the 
parties used for a few months prior to the purchase of the 
Reinell boat. Also, he claimed entitlement for storage charges 
for storing the boat. There is no evidence that he ever billed 
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plaintiff for those charges, or that he pursued collection 
thereof. He was living with plaintiff rent-free at the time, 
and was perhaps otherwise compensated. A claim asserted 
several years later during divorce proceedings has a hollow 
ring thereto, and the Court finds the claim lacking in merit. 
The Reinell boat was taken by defendant at the time of the 
separation of the parties, and was stored out in the open. He 
did not use the boat while he had it. The parties appeared 
before the Commissioner July 18, 1990, and plaintiff secured 
possession of the boat as a result of that hearing. 
Thereafter, plaintiff expended $2,849.41 for repairs, for which 
she seeks recovery thereof from defendant. Also, she asserts 
that two marine batteries were missing, as well as a stainless 
steel propeller, oars, anchor and ropes. She then sold the 
boat without notice to and without the consent of defendant. 
There was no substantial evidence of the condition of the boat 
when defendant took possession thereof. It was covered while 
defendant had it. What might have been attributable to 
ordinary wear and tear, as opposed to damage attributable to 
defendant, was not given any reasonable explanation. There was 
no evidence adduced as to when and where the items came up 
missing, or as to what the value thereof was. Plaintiff 
TORRES V. TORRES PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
asserted a $700.00 loss in the sale, but whether the 
transaction was arms length or what the market value of the 
boat was is likewise not provided by the record herein. 
Plaintiff's claim for reimbursement for repairs is similar to 
defendant's claim, and is likewise found to be without merit. 
The Court also finds that the record does not support a finding 
that defendant is entitled to any interest in the boat, or the 
proceeds thereof. 
7. On or about September 26, 1987, defendant purchased 
two ladies rings from Morgan Jewelers, one costing $1,575.00 
and the ladies solitaire ring costing $2,538.00. Defendant 
incurred charges on his charge account in the total amount of 
$4,327.03. Shortly before Christmas 1987, defendant gave them 
as gifts to plaintiff. When the parties separated in 
mid-January 1989, defendant was still paying on the rings. 
Plaintiff is awarded the rings, subject to her repaying 
defendant for all documented payments he made on the rings 
after the separation in mid-January 1989. Defendant may 
continue to hold a possessory lien thereon until all amounts 
provided herein are fully satisfied. Defendant is to restore 
the original stones to the rings, and obtain certification from 
Morgan Jewelers that the rings are as originally delivered to 
him in September, 1987. 
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8. At the time of the separation, defendant was employed 
by Salt Lake City Corporation. He had medical and dental 
coverage on plaintiff, which cost him $17.50 per pay period. 
On or about January 14, 1989, defendant hit plaintiff in 
the jaw, fracturing the right mandible. The insurance covered 
the treatment of the multiple fractures, except for $65.75, 
which defendant acknowledges he owes. Defendant shall pay 
plaintiff for the uncovered portion of the treatment in the 
amount of $65.75. 
Defendant caused plaintiff's coverage terminated effective 
August 12, 1990, several months before the divorce was granted 
herein. There were no controlling temporary orders concerning 
health care coverage. 
A pretrial was held before Commissioner Peuler on November 
2, 1989. The minute entry is silent on the issue of 
insurance. A second pretrial was held before the undersigned 
on February 1, 1990. Plaintiff testified that defendant 
mentioned she was taken off the insurance, and that the Court 
admonished defendant to reinstate coverage. The minute entry 
doesn't reflect any details of the conference. Apparently, no 
request for an order was made, and no order was entered by the 
Court on the issue of insurance. The Court has no independent 
recollection thereon. 
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During July 1990, plaintiff consulted with a physician 
about treatment for a deviated septum and a ventral hernia. 
One physician obtained pre-approval from Utah Public Employees 
Health Program. On August 15, 1990, surgical correction of the 
two conditions took place and UPEH has declined payment for 
lack of coverage. Total medical bills were incurred in the 
amount of $4,690.09. Plaintiff seeks recovery of this amount 
from defendant. Since there was no order thereon, the Court 
finds that it is reasonable that these obligations be treated 
as any other marital obligation. Accordingly, the Court orders 
defendant to pay one-half of said amount, plus accruing 
interest thereon and one-half of any fees or costs taxed 
against the parties through any collection or legal actions, 
and hold plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
9. Both parties seek an award of attorney's fees herein. 
Plaintiff asserts that she should be awarded one-half of a fee 
which ultimately will be around $5,500.00. Defendant, on the 
other hand, claims entitlement to a fee of just over 
$2,500.00. The financial statements herein indicated plaintiff 
had monthly income approximating $1,550.00, while defendant had 
monthly income of $1,793.00. Neither party has demonstrated 
need for an award of fees. 
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Both parties, in concert with their attorneys, have 
contributed to the inability to settle. Generally, plaintiff, 
because of the nature of the disputed assets, as described 
above, wanted everything. On the other hand, defendant felt 
justified in wanting something. The dropping of health and 
medical coverage on plaintiff ended any possibility of 
settlement. Each party has paid a high price. On balance, 
each party should bear their own attorney's fees and costs. 
Counsel for plaintiff shall prepare and submit to opposing 
counsel for approval appropriate supplemental Findings, 
Conclusions and supplemental Decree, consistent with the 
foregoing. ^p 
Dated this .day of November, 1991<. 
9^Vi' 
KENNETH RIGTRUP / 
DISTRICT COURT JtfDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
this day of November, 1991: 
Craig M. Peterson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
David R. Hartwig 
Attorney for Defendant 
263 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Craig M. Peterson (2579) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITT1EFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
LYNNETTE MANSXE TORRES, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
v. : 
JOHN MARTIN TORRES, : 
Defendant, : Case No. 894902184 
: Judge 
ooOoo 
The above matter came before the Court for trial on July 
31, 1991 and concluded on August 6f 1991. The Plaintiff was 
present in person and represented by counsel, Craig M. Peterson. 
The Defendant was present in person and represented by counsel, 
David R. Hartwig. The Court having considered the testimony of the 
witnesses who were sworn and testified, having reviewed a large 
number of exhibits, which were offered and received, having 
reviewed the pleadings on file herein, and being well-advised in 
the premises, does enter its Findings of Fact as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. A Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter by 
the Court on February 4, 1991. All other issues were reserved for 
trial. The issues remaining for disposition at trial were (a) 
interest claimed by Defendant in Plaintiff's home; (b) interest 
claimed by Defendant in a 1973 Reinell boat; (c) the entitlement to 
two (2) diamond rings; (d) responsibility for outstanding medical 
bills of $65.75 for treatment of Plaintiff's jaw; (e) 
responsibility for outstanding medical bills for surgery to the 
Plaintiff during August, 1990; (f) each of the parties claims for 
reimbursement of expenses incurred for boat repairs; and (g) 
reciprocal claims for attorney's fees. 
2. The parties were married July 19, 1986. They lived 
together for approximately three months prior to their marriage. 
The separated about mid-January, 1989. The pleadings in this case 
were filed on June 16f 1989. 
3. Defendant was divorced from his prior wife in Junef 
1986. Defendant's business had failed and he was winding up his 
business prior to this time. He had problems with the Internal 
Revenue Service, and they exeucted on everything of value. He had 
already gone through bankruptcy during 1985. 
4. Plaintiff was living in her own home with her 
dauahters from a orior marriaae when a relationship commenced with 
•J «m •* — 
the Defendant, She was a self-employed cosmetologist. 
5. The parties did not file a joinr tax return for the 
year 1986, the year of the marriage. Plaintiff sustained an 
operating loss of approximately $3,800 in her business for that 
year. Defendant started employment for CR England & Son sometime 
around that time, but apparently, did not have sufficient earnings 
to justify the filing of a joint tax return and the use of the net 
operating loss for tax purposes. 
6. In 1987, Defendant brought in earnings of 
approximately $26,500, while Plaintiff reported $787 income from 
her business. Defendant earned approximately $24,000 in 1988 while 
Plaintiff earned approximately $4,200 from her business. Joint 
returns were not filed in 1989 and Plaintiff had a net income from 
her business for that year of approximately $8,800. 
7. Plaintiff purchased her home at 3773 South 3520 
West, West Valley City, Utah in 1992 for approximately $52,000. 
The Defendant claims an interest in that home. As of May 13, 1991, 
the value of the home was appraised at $37,000. The home has a 
current mortgage of approximately $47,000. During the marriage, 
the home was repainted, re-carpeted, the fireplace was removed and 
refinished, the basement was finished, including finishing of a 
bathroomf cedar was installed in the closet, a banister was 
installed down the stairway, the backyard v/as completed and a 
cement patio was installed. Alsof ceramic tile was installed in 
the entry and kitchen. Materials and outside labor cost 
approximately $6,000, most of which came from marital funds. The 
greater part of the labor was performed by the Defendant, and a 
small portion of the labor was hired, and Plaintiff and her two 
daughters were involved in the work. A reasonable value for all of 
the home improvements, at the time of completion, was $12,000. 
Even though the home has depreciated over the past several years, 
the improvements added value to the property. It is reasonable for 
the Diefendant to be awarded $4,000 as the reasonable value of his 
contributions to the improvements. 
8. The Plaintiff purchased a 22 1/2 1973 Reinell boat 
from Sruce Green on July 2, 1986. She paid $4,500 as a down 
payment from her own funds and borrowed the balance from First 
Security Bank of Utah. Defendant claims he contributed 
approximately $1,200 to the purchase price through work he 
performed on a Bayliner boat owned by Mike Peterson, which the 
parties used for a few months prior to the purchase of the Reinell 
boat. He also claimed entitlement for storage charges for the 
boat. There is no evidence that he ever billed Plaintiff for those 
charges or that he pursued collection of those charges. He was 
living with Plaintiff rent free at the time and was perhaps 
otherwise compensated. A claim asserted several years later during 
divorce proceedings has a hollow ring thereto, and the Court finds 
the claim lacking in merit. 
9. The Reineli boat was taken by the Defendant at the 
time of the separation of the parties and was stored out in the 
open. He did not use the boat while he had it in his possession. 
The parties appeared before the Commissioner on July 18, 1990f and 
Plaintiff was awarded possession of the boat as a result of that 
hearing. After obtaining possession, Plaintiff expended $2,849.41 
for repairs for which she seeks recovery from Defendant. She also 
asserts that two marine batteries were missing, as well as a 
stainless steel propeller, oars, an anchor and ropes. She sold the 
boat without notice to and without the consent of the Defendant. 
There was no substantial evidence of the condition of the boat when 
Defendant took possession of it. The boat was covered while it was 
in the control and possession of the Defendant. What might have 
been considered ordinary wear and tear as opposed to damage 
attributable to Defendant, was not given any reasonable 
explanation. There was no evidence deduced as to when and where 
the items came up missing, or as to the value of those items. 
Plaintiff asserted a $700 loss on the sale, but whether the 
transaction was arms length or what the market value of the boat 
was, is likewise, not provided by the record. Plaintiff's claim 
for reimbursement for repairs is similar to Defendant's claim, and 
is likewise, found to be without merit. The record does not 
support a finding that Defendant is entitled to any interest in the 
boat or the proceeds from the sale. 
10. On or about September 25, 1987, Defendant purchased 
two ladies' rings from Morgan Jewelers, one costing $1,575 and the 
other, a ladies' solitaire ring, costing $2,538. Defendant 
incurred charges on his charge account in the total amount of 
$4,327.03. Shortly before Christmas 1987, Defendant gave the rings 
to the Plaintiff as gifts. When the parties separated in mid-
January, 1989, Defendant was still paying on the rings. Plaintiff 
is awarded the rings, subject to her repaying the Defendant for all 
documented payments he made on the rings after the separation in 
mid-January, 1989. Defendant may continue to hold a possessory 
lien on the rings until all amounts provided herein are fully 
satisfied. The Defendant has removed the original stones from the 
rings and the stones are to be restored to the rings, and Defendant 
is to obtain certification from Morgan Jewelers that the rings are 
as originally delivered to him in September, 1987. 
11. At the time of separation, the Defendant was 
employed by Salt Lake City Corporation. He had medical and dental 
coverage on Plaintiff which cost him $17.50 per pay period. 
On or about January 14f 1989, Defendant hit Plaintiff in 
the jaw, fracturing the right mandible. The insurance covered the 
treatment of the multiple fractures, except for $65.75, which 
Defendant acknowledges he owes. Defendant should be ordered to pay 
for the uncovered portion of the treatment in the amount of $65.75. 
12. Defendant caused Plaintiff's insurance coverage to 
be terminated effective August 12, 1990, several months before the 
divorce was granted in this matter. There were no controlling 
Temporary Orders concerning health care coverage. A pre-trial was 
held before Commissioner Peuler on November 2, 1989. The Minute 
Entry is silent on the issue of insurance. A second pre-trial was 
held • before the undersigned judge on February 1, 1990. The 
Plaintiff testified that the Defendant mentioned that he had taken 
her off of the insurance coverage, and the Court admonished 
Defendant to reinstate the coverage. The Minute Entry does not 
reflect any details of the pre-trial conference. Apparently, no 
requests for an Order was made, and no Order was entered by the 
Court on the issue of insurance. The Court has no independent 
recollection thereof. 
During July, 1990, Plaintiff consulted with a physician 
about treatment for a deviated septum and a ventral hernia. One 
physician obtained pre.-approval from the Utah Public Employee's 
Health Program. On August 15, 1990, surgical correction of the two 
conditions took place, and the Utah Public Employee's Health 
i 
Program has declined payment for lack of coverage. The Defendant 
terminated health care coverage for the Plaintiff through the Utah 
Public Employees Health Program on August 15f 1990, the date of the 
surgery. The termination of the coverage was retroactive to August 
1, 1990. The total medical bills incurred for the surgery were in 
the amount of $4,690.09. Plaintiff seeks recovery of this amount 
from the Defendant. Since there was no Order regarding health 
insurance, the Court finds it is reasonable that these obligations 
be treated as any other marital obligation. Accordingly, the Court 
finds that each of the parties should pay one-half of the medical 
costs, plus accruing interest thereon, and one-half of any fees or 
costs taxed against the parties for any collection or legal 
actions, and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
13. Both parties seek an award of attorney's fees 
herein. Plaintiff asserts that she should be awarded one-half of 
the fee, which ultimately will be around $5,500. Defendant, on the 
other hand, claims entitlement to a fee of just over $2,500. 
Financial statements herein indicated Plaintiff had a monthly 
income of approximately $1,550, while the Defendant had a monthly 
income of $1,793. Neither party has demonstrated a need for an 
award of fees > 
Both parties, in concert with their attorneys, have 
contributed to the inability to settle. Generally, Plaintiff, 
because of the nature of the disputed assets as decribed above, 
wanted everything. On the other hand, Defendant felt justified in 
wanting something. The dropping of health and medical coverage on 
Plaintiff ended any possibility of settlement. Each party has paid 
a high price. On balance, each party should bear their own 
attorney's fees and cosrs. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, this Court 
does • now enter its just and equitable Conclusions of Law as 
follows: 
1. A Supplemental Decree of Divorce should be entered 
in this matter reflecting the Findings of the Court set out above. 
2. The Defendant should be awarded an equity lien 
against the Plaintiff's residence in the amount of $4,000. 
3. The Plaintiff should be awarded ail right, title and 
interest in and to the proceeds from the sale of the 1972 Reinell 
boat, and each of the parties should be denied any additional 
claims they have made for recovery on losses and repairs made to 
said boat. 
4. The Plaintiff should be awarded both rings purchased 
by the Defendant from Morgan Jewelers on or about September 26, 
1987. However, Plaintiff should be ordered to reimburse the 
i 
Defendant for any payments he has made to Morgan Jewelers for the 
rings since the parties' separation in mid-January, 1989. The 
Defendant should be ordered to hold a possessory lien en the rings 
until the payments provided herein are fully satisfied. The 
Defendant should be ordered to restore the original stones to the 
rings and obtain certification from Morgan Jewelers that the rings 
are the same as they were when they were originally delivered to 
him in September, 1987. 
5. The Defendant should be ordered to pay the uncovered 
portion of treatment for the Plaintiff's jaw in the amount of 
$65.75. 
6. Each of the parties should be ordered to pay one-
half of the total medical bills incurred for surgery and treatment 
to the Plaintiff on or about August 15, 1990 for a deviated septum 
and a ventral hernia. Further, each of the parties should be 
ordered to pay one-half of any fees or costs taxed against the 
parties through any collection or legal actions, and the Defendant 
should be ordered to hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
7. Each of the parties should be ordered to pay their 
own attorney's fees and costs which they have incurred in these 
proceedings. 
.Jr 
DATED this _j££fday of January, 1992. 
BY THE/COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, this ^ day of January, 1992, to: 
David R. Hartwig, Esq. 
263 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 
Torree.FOP/P12 
ifrn 
:JJ mm mm 
Craig M. Peterson (2579) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 'East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
LYNNETTE MANSKE TORRES, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN MARTIN TORRES, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 894902184 
ooOoo 
The above matter came before the Court for trial on July 
31, 1991 and concluded on August 6, 1991. The Plaintiff was 
present in person and represented by counsel, Craig M. Peterson. 
The Defendant was present in person and represented by counsel, 
David R. Hartwig. The Court having heretofore entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, does now enter its Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce as follows: 
1 
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. The Decree of Divorce heretofore entered in this 
matter on February 4, 1991, is supplemented for the division of 
property by this Order. 
2. The Defendant shall be awarded an equity lien 
against the Plaintiff's residence in the amount of $4f000. 
3. The Plaintiff shall be awarded all right, title and 
interest in and to the proceeds from the sale of the 1973 Reinell 
boatf and each of the parties shall be denied any additional claims 
they have made for recovery on losses and repairs made to said 
boat. 
4. The Plaintiff shall be awarded both rings purchased 
by the Defendant from Morgan Jewelers on or about September 26, 
1987. However, Plaintiff is ordered to reimburse the Defendant for 
any payments he has made to Morgan Jewelers for the rings since the 
parties' separation in mid-Januaryf 1989. The Defendant shall hold 
a possessory lien on the rings until the payments provided herein 
are fully satisfied. The Defendant shall restore the original 
stones to the rings and obtain certification from Morgan Jewelers 
that the rings are the same as they were when they were originally 
delivered to him in September, 1987. 
2 
5. The Defendant shall be ordered to pay the uncovered 
portion of treatment for the Plaintiff's jaw in the amount of 
$65.75. 
6. Each of the parties shall pay one-half of the total 
medical bills incurred for surgery and treatment to the Plaintiff 
on or about August 15, 1990 for a deviated septum and a ventral 
hernia. Further, each of the parties shall be ordered to pay one-
half of any fees or costs taxed against the parties through any 
collection or legal actions, and the Defendant shall be ordered to 
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
7. Each of the parties shall be ordered to pay their 
own attorney's fees and costs which they have incurred in these 
proceedings. -+-
DATED this 7b) "day of January, 1992. 
BY Tg^'COURT: 
i/0 
\ 
A 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered, 
a true and correct
 ycopy of the forecoing, SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF 
DIVORCE, thxs >> day of January, 1992, to: 
David R. Hartwig, Esq. 
263 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Torres.SDC/P12 
4 
APPENDIX "B 
1 Q« Was that ever terminated? 
2 A* Yes. 
3 Q. When was it terminated? 
41 A. The first time, August 11th. 
5 Q# August 11th of what year? 
6 A. *90. 
7 Q. Was it reinstated? 
81 A, Yes* 
9 Q# When was it reinstated? 
10 A. October 7th, f90. 
11 Q. And is it now an insurance plan which is 
12 under what we call COBRA benefit? 
13 A* Yes. 
14 Q* Was that accomplished in January of 
15 1991? 
16 A. Yes, January 27th. 
17 Q« And do all the records that you have in 
18 front of you support the answers that you've given 
19 here today to the questions that I just asked you? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q# And, in addition -- well, if I can have 
22 that, please? 
23 Also attached to this exhibit is a cover 
24 letter from my office asking you to bring these 
25| records to the trial, is that correct? 
11 BLACKWOOD WIT PLF Dir 
1 Plaintiff's 16, your Honor* 
2 THE COURT: Any objection? 
3 MR* HARTWIG: Ifd like the opportunity 
4 to at least review them, your Honor* 
5 THE COURT: Do you want to show them to 
6 Counsel? 
7 MR* PETERSON: I previously reviewed 
8 that document out in the hall during the prior 
9 proceeding, is that correct? 
10 A* Yes* 
11 Q* And I have tabbed that exhibit with 
12 yellow tabs* Can you, please, turn to the first tab, 
13 and I'm going to give you a pen, and ask you to mark 
14 that tab as A. And directly underneath that, mark 
15 that Tab B* What is Tab B? 
16 A* Tab B is a copy of a change card that 
17 was sent to PEHP, removing Lynette effective August 
18 12th, '90. 
19 Q* Who's that signed by? 
20 A* John Torres* 
21 Q* So, on August — did you say 11th or 
22 12th? 
23 A* The coverage was terminated on the 
24 12th. She was covered the 11th up until midnight, and 
25 then dropped at 12:00* 
I 13 BLACKWOOD WIT PLP Dir 
1 records concerning an injury to the jaw? 
21 A. Yes. 
3 Q# Would you please tell the Court what you 
4 have found as regards to the jaw? 
5 A* Pardon me? 
6 Q# What were your findings? What did the 
7 records show you? 
8 A* There was a claim for a fracture of the 
9 mandible, which is the jaw, in January of '89 and 
10 February of ,89# 
11 Q. Do you show any other claims for that --
12 for the jaw and mandible? 
13 A. Not after February of '89. 
14 Q. As part of your usual course of 
15 business, do you ever receive notice of any further 
16 pending treatment from physicians or health care 
17 providers? 
18 A. Yes, occasionally we will. 
19 Q. Have you, in your review of these 
20 records, found any such notifications? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. What would this notification look like, 
23| can you explain to the Court what this would be? 
24| A. It would be a report from the physician 
251 indicating possible future treatment. 
35 FIELD WIT DEF Dir 
1 Q. And, again, just for clarification, you 
2 haven't found any such indication? 
3 A, No* 
4 MR. HARTWIG: No further questions for 
5 this witness, your Honor* 
6 THE COURT: You may cross* 
7 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
8 BY MR. PETERSON* 
9 Q. I am sorry. What is your name? 
10 A. Gary Field. 
11 Q. Field? 
121 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Mr. Field, the document that you just 
14 looked at, does it indicate how the injury occurred to 
15 the jaw? 
16 A# None of the documents indicate how it 
17 occurred, no. 
18 Q. Is there a notation on one of those 
19 documents that says: "Husband hit her in the jaw"? 
20 In fact, I believe I saw it out in the 
21 hall. 
22 MR. HARTWIG: We are stipulating that 
23 there was a confrontation, and an injury was caused by 
24 my client. 
25 MR. PETERSON: Okay* That's fine. I 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
For surgery performed when? 
"August 15th, 1990." 
Now, would you move to -- so there was a 
check sent to the St. Mark's Hospital, and you 
demanded its return, is that correct? 
A, We asked for its reimbursement because 
of the termination, yes. 
Q. And Page 1 is a copy of that check, Page 
1 of A? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, if you'll mark the next yellow tab, 
B, please? 
And, again, that document consists of, 
as I recall, two pages, is that correct, or is it 
three? 
A. Three. 
Q. And the second page of that document 
marked "B" is what? 
A. A letter from myself indicating the same 
reason. 
Q. 
A. 
And who is that addressed to? 
Dr. Kendrick Morrison. 
Q. And telling Dr. Morrison to return a 
check that was sent to him for payment of the surgery, 
is that correct? 
38 FIELD WIT DEF X 
1 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR, HARTWIG: 
3 Q. Okay, this surgery in August of 1990, do 
4 your records show what it was for? 
5 MR. PETERSON: Objection, your Honor; 
6 relevancy* I don't understand •what it is for" is 
7 relevant, at all. 
81 THE COURT: Overruled. 
9 You may answer. 
10 THE WITNESS: A ventral hernia surgery. 
11 MR. HARTWIG: Okay. Do you have any 
12 knowledge or understanding of what the different 
13 surgeries are? 
14 A. Some. 
15 Q. Can you state whether this surgery would 
16 be, based on that limited knowledge, in any way 
17 related to the jaw injury from 1989? 
18 A. No. 
19 MR. PETERSON: Objection, your Honor. 
20 It is not relevant. We are making no allegation that 
21 it is related to the jaw injury. 
22 THE COURT: Sustained. 
23 MR. HARTWIG: If you would refer to the 
24 entitlement authority, the preauthorization order I 
25 believe it was 15-C? 
45 FIELD WIT DEF Redir 
1 MR. PETERSONj 17. 
21 MR# HARTWIGi Excuse me. Thank youf 
3 17-E, I believe, is the preauthorization? 
4 A, Correct, yes. 
5 Q# Is there a disclaimer at the bottom 
6 concerning the effect or the basis of this 
7 authorization? 
8 A# Second paragraph indicates approval of 
9 the surgery at the very -- the last sentence of the 
10 paragraph indicates: "The benefits are subject to 
11 coverage eligibility at time of service/ 
12 MR* HARTWIG: Thank you. 
13 No further questions. 
14 THE COURT* Anything further? 
15 MR. PETERSON: Just briefly, your 
16 Honor. 
17 Does the doctor's preauthorization 
18 request letter also indicate that the surgery was for 
19 a deviated septum, two surgeries? 
20 THE WITNESS: The authorization is for a 
21 ventral hernia surgery. 
22 MR PETERSON: The doctorfs letter is 
23 what I was asking about. 
24 THE WITNESS: Oh, Ifm sorry. 
25| Which doctor? 
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Q. And that Appraisal states the current 
value, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The value then is approximately ten or 
eleven thousand dollars less than the 
currently-outstanding mortgage? 
A. Yes. 
Q. While you were married to the Defendant, 
was the home remodeled? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, it was. 
How was it remodeled? 
We repainted, took out the fireplace. 
recarpeted and new handrailing; finished a bathroom 
downstairs. 
Q. 
A. 
How was that paid for? 
A lot of it was cash and checks 
Q. I show you what's been marked as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 18. 
Was that document prepared in my office 
with your assistance and at your direction? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That document was entitled "Remodeling 
paid for by Plaintiff," and it has an address there, 
is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
55 MANSKE WIT PLF Dir 
1 Q. And at the time that you remodeled the 
2 house, had he opened his own account? 
3 A. I donft remember when he opened his 
4 account* 
5 Q* The cash or the checks that were written 
6 for the improvements, who paid for those? 
7 A* I did. 
8 Q* DDid you pay for itr then, entirely, or 
9 did Mr* Torres make some contributions? 
10 A* He made some contributions* 
11 Q. Approximately how much would you 
12 estimate he made? 
13 A* Maybe a fourth. 
14 Q. Fourth of the total cost? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And what was the total cost, as 
17 represented on Plaintiff's Exhibit No* 18? 
18 A. "$5,943*67*" 
19 Q. So, itfs possible that he made 
20 approximately a fourteen hundred dollar contribution, 
21 then? 
22 A. Possibly. 
23 Q. Did he contribute labor? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q* How much labor? 
58 MANSKE WIT PLF Dir 
A, 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
The same as the rest of us* 
Was he paid for his labor? 
Not with money. 
Let me ask you, while he was living 
there, did he make any mortgage payments? 
A# I think he made one* 
Q. How many years did he live there? 
A# Two. 
Q. Sof he made one mortgage payment in 24 
months? 
A. That was out of his checking account* 
But I also gave him money to put in his checking 
account to make the house payment. At that time, we 
were trying to set up some type of distribution of the 
bills. 
Q. So, even though he may have made that 
mortgage payment, you gave him the money for that 
purpose? 
A. Yes. 
there? 
Q« 
A. 
expenses? 
A. 
Did he pay any rent while he was living 
No. 
Did he contribute to food and household 
Yes. 
59 MANSKE WIT PLP Dir 
1 Q. How much? 
2 A. He would give me his checks, and I'd 
3 usually deposit them in my checking account, which I 
4 would in turn give him back almost more than half of 
5 it for his weekly expenses. 
6 Q. Is it your opinion that he's entitled to 
7 receive any funds for the remodeling of the home? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q* Is it your opinion that he have a place 
10 to live without cost? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Have you offered him the home if he'll 
13 simply clear your name from the mortgage? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Are you willing that the Court allow him 
16 to take the home, today, if he'll clear your name from 
17 the mortgage? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Did you own a boat during the marriage? 
20 A. Yes, I did. 
21 Q. When was the boat purchased? 
22 A. July 1st, '86. 
23 Q. Approximately 20 days or so before you 
24 were married? 
25 A. Yes. 
60 MANSKE WIT PLF Dir 
1 Q. And why is it that you want them 
2 delivered to Morgan Jewelers and you pick them up from 
3 Morgan Jewelers? 
4 A. I would like them to take out the stones 
5 to make sure that they are not cubic zirconium. 
5 Q. How did the rings come into the 
7 possession of Mr. Torres? 
8 A* He asked me to let him take them and 
9 have them appraised so that I could get the insurance 
10 through my homeowners and he wouldn't have to pay 
11 Morgan Jewelers that high of insurance. 
12 Q. In fact, are you willing, even though 
13 those were gifts, to take over the payoff as of today 
14 at Morgan Jewelers? 
15 A. I donft think I should have to because 
16 they were gifts, but I would. 
17 Q. In fact, are you concerned that they 
18 would not be paid for unless you do take over the 
19 payments? 
20 A. Pardon me? 
21 Q. Are you, in fact, concerned that they 
22 would not be paid for by Mr. Torres unless you do take 
23 over that payment? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Are you asking the Court to give you 
80 MANSKE WIT PLF Dir 
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anything along those lines? 
A. Yes. 
Q. These checks that were attached to your 
exhibit, as to the repairs, were those all from your 
personal account? 
A. Which exhibit was that? The two checks 
that I'm looking at, one is from my personal, and one 
is from my business. 
Q. Okay, so you actually did make payment 
from your business account for personal purposes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You testified that John did not pay 
rent. Have you ever been married before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did your prior husband ever pay rent 
while you were married? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you expect rent from your prior 
husband? 
A, NO. 
Q, But you expected that John pay rent 
during this marriage? 
A. John lived in my house free of rent for 
three months before the marriage. 
Q. Is that with your consent? 
96 MANSKE WIT PLF X 
1 A* Yes, because he had no money. 
2 Q# So, you did then allow him to live 
3 without the expectation of rent, "yes" or "no"? 
4 A. Yes* 
5 Q* And yet, now, today, you are saying, at 
6 least that"s my understanding from your testimony, is 
7 that somehow he should have? 
8 A. Ifm not saying that. All I'm saying is 
9 that he did not contribute. 
10 Q. Concerning the boat, and, right now, Ifd 
11 like to focus on the Raynell boat, so that we know 
12 which boat we are talking about. Itfs my 
13 understanding that this was purchased July 1st, 1986, 
14 is that correct? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And that was a mere 20 days before your 
17 marriage? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. When did you plan on getting married to 
20 John? 
21 A. He set the date, July 19th. 
22 Q. When did you agree to that? 
23 A. About -- well, the 30 days after --
24 before that, because his divorce was just final from 
25 Nancy. 
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1 THE COURTi Sustained. 
2 MR. HARTWIG: Okay. I'd like to turn, 
3 now, to the diamond rings, or the diamond/ruby and 
4 diamond ring. 
5 You indicated that youfd be willing to 
6 take the rings and assume the payments, thereon, is 
7 that a correct summation of your testimony? 
8 A. If I had to. 
9 Q# Are you aware that it has been 
10 Defendant's position that if you wanted the rings, 
11 that you could have them, as long as you assumed the 
12 liability, thereon, and held him harmless, therefrom? 
13 A. Pardon me? 
14 Q# Are you aware of the Defendant's 
15 position, that you could be awarded the rings that's 
16 -- that are involved here, as long as you would have 
17 assumed the payments, thereon, and held him harmless? 
18 A* He never offered both rings. I offered 
19 me one ring. 
20 Q# You don't -- you have no -- do you 
21 recall appearing before the Court last summer for a 
22 pretrial conference before Commissioner Peuler? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q# Do you remember having it communicated 
25 to you that it would be possible to have both rings if 
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or --
A # Well, I don't count on my calendar how 
often I go out; once or twice a month. 
Q # 
exhibits, PI 
A. 
Q. 
review it* 
correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
°* 
Jewelers? 
A
* 
Q* 
A # 
Q. 
A # 
Q
* 
here today? 
A # 
things that 
Do you have in front of you, with the 
aintiff's Exhibit P-22? 
Yes. 
I've asked you to look at that and 
This is a charge sales slip, is that 
It looks like it. 
And whose name is it in? 
"John Torres." 
Have you made any payments to Morgan 
Yes, I made one. 
One payment? 
I think so. 
When? 
I don't remember the date. 
Do you have any documentation with you 
I believe there's a check in some of the 
I have there. 
MR. HARTWIGi Counsel, do you have --
120 MANSKE WIT PLF X 
1 MR. PETERSON: I don't know* 
2 Do we have a check? Do you recall a 
3 check? 
4 She says a check. I assume that there 
5 is one. Did you want to review it? 
6 MR. HARTWIG: While he's looking for it, 
7 at this point, Ifll hold. 
8 And these rings were purchased, then --
9 A. "9-26-87." 
10 Q. ,,9-26-87•l, And then you've made one 
11 payment since that time. 
12 Have you received any notices or any 
13 overdue bills or anything like that, any indication 
14 from Morgan Jewelers that this account has not been 
15 paid? 
16 A. Not lately, but then John only let 
17 certain people know his change of address. 
18 Q. Are you aware of the fact, presently, 
19 that payments have been made on this? 
20 A* Mo. 
21 Q. Okay. At this time, I'd like to go to 
22 the surgery involved, your pre-approved surgery, 
23 Plaintiff's Exhibit 23 — 
24 A# I'm sorry. I don't have a copy in front 
25 of me — oh, there it is. 
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1 Q. And I would like to have you turn to the 
2 default judgmentr which is the fourth page from the 
3 end. 
4 Okay, were you served with process in 
5 this matter? 
6 A. Yes* 
7 Q. And you admit that this is, as it 
8 indicates, a default judgment? 
91 A. Yes. 
10 Q. And do you understand what a default 
11 judgment is? 
12 A. Not exactly. 
13 Q. Are you aware that it was a judgment 
14 taken against you because you apparently failed to 
15 answer or in any way contest this? 
16 THE COURT: The Court has a modest 
17 understanding of default judgments. I don't know why 
18 we go through these questions with the witness that 
19 obviously doesn't have any knowledge about it. Canft 
20 the Court take judicial notice of how default 
21 judgments are obtained? 
22 MR. HARTWIG: Certainly, the Court may, 
23 your Honor. I was getting to the point that I'm --
24 THE COURT: Why don't you do that in 
25 argument? Why waste the time with the witness? 
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1 Obviously, the witness hasn't sufficient knowledge 
2 about these things* 
3 MR* HARTWIGi Quite simply, your Honor, 
4 if I may ask, then, my next question, I think that 
5 purpose will come to light* 
6 Then, you essentially did nothing as far 
7 as to try to contest this matter? 
8 A, Yes, I did. 
9 Q* You did -- you did not enter an 
10 appearance or in any way contest the legal action 
11 then, is that correct? 
12 A. I didn't myself, no* 
13 Q. Did you do it through counsel that you 
14 hired? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 MR* HARTWIG* Then, if I may address the 
17 Court, your Honor, there appears to be --
18 THE COURT: Well, when we get to the 
19 close of testimony, I think you can make your point in 
20 closing argument* 
21 MR. HARTWIGi I shall, your Honor. 
22 What attorney did you hire to represent 
23 you in this matter? 
24 A. Craig Peterson* 
25 Q* Do you know that he -- excuse me* Do 
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1 you know whether he entered an appearance in this 
2 matter to contest this debt? 
3 A. Nof I don«t. 
4 Q. Did you, yourself, other than hiring 
5 Mr* Peterson, attempt to do to anything to prevent 
6 this judgment from entering? 
7 A* I turned all this information over to my 
8 attorney* 
9 Q* And do you have any idea of what 
10 Mr* Peterson did for you in this particular matter? 
11 A* He had this set aside* 
12 Q* The default judgment has been set aside? 
13 A* Yes. 
14 MR* HARTWIGx Then, no further 
15 questions, your Honor, on that issue* 
16 Were you present in court when your 
17 witness -- I believe her name is Kate Blackwood --
18 gave her testimony? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q* And you were also present when our 
21 witness, Gary Field, gave his testimony? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Do you remember Mr* Field testifying to 
24 the fact that the authorization document, the letter 
25 authorizing your surgery, indicated at the bottom that 
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1 it was approved if you were covered as of the date of 
2 surgery? 
3 A* Yes, 
4 Q. Did you check with your physicians or 
5 check with the Public Employees Health Administrat ion, 
6 at all, during the period of time from the receipt of 
7 the letter until your surgery? 
8 A* My doctors did* 
9 Q. Did you? 
10 A. No, I did not. 
11 Q. You didnft call anybody to see if there 
12 was going to be any problems or anything else along 
13 that line? 
14 A. My doctor told me he*d take care of it 
15 all. 
16 MR. HARTWIGt Your Honor, I believe 
17 thatfs simple hearsay, and ask that it be stricken, 
18 and ask that the witness --
19 THE COURT: It may be stricken. 
20 MR. HARTWIGi -- answer the question. 
21 What Ifm asking, then, if I understand 
22 what you are saying correctly: You did not check, 
23 prior to entering the hospital, whether the 
24 authorization was still good, is that correct? 
25| A. I didn't think I had to, since he was 
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1 ordered to keep me on the insurance. 
2 Qt Do you have any idea where that order 
3 is? 
4 A. It was between us and Judge Rigtrup's 
5 office, 
6 Q. And have you seen any order that 
7 indicated that? 
8 A« No, I have not. 
9 Q* Is it my understanding of your testimony 
10 that you have previously offered Mr. Torres your 
11 residence? 
12 A. Yes, that's correct. 
13 Q. When? 
14 A. I offered it to him when he said he had 
15 $20,000 equity in it. 
16 Q. When? 
17 A. Right after we separated. 
18 Q. Any time since litigation had commenced, 
19 do you know, has there been an offer communicated to 
20 Mr. Torres that he could walk into your house and take 
21 it essentially free and clear if you'd just clear your 
22 name? 
23 A. Say that again? 
24 Q. Let me try rephrasing it. Since we 
25 commenced this case, did you ever communicate that 
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1 is? 
2 A* It's my f86 returns* 
3 Q. Okay* And do you file a Schedule C or 
4 some sort of self-employment? 
5 A* I have no idea. That's why I have a 
6 bookkeeper* 
7 Q. If I may, then, point out, I'm, for 
8 purposes of the record, showing the top page, which i 
9 the 1040. 
10 And I would have you look at Line 12, 
11 and would you please read what that is? 
12 A. "Business Income or L o s s / 
13 Q. Okay. And that figure is? 
14 A* "$3,853." 
15 Q. Is that a negative? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Does this document reflect that you had 
18 any other income for that year? 
19 A* Not unless it says "child support," no. 
20 Q. And this was solely, then, from your 
21 business? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. At this point, I'm presenting to the 
24 witness Defendant's Exhibit 12, which is the 1987 tax 
25 returns. 
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1| Do you recognize that document? 
2| A. Yes* 
3| Q. To the best of your knowledge# is that a 
true and correct copy of what it portends to be? 
A. It's true and correct as far as Jerry 
(I and Juli, They put the wrong last names on there. 
? That is not their names. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17; 
IBi 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. But, as far as you know, the rest of the 
document — essentially, these are just true and 
correct copies, and you have no reason to doubt that 
they have been altered in any way from the originals 
that have been filed? 
A* No* They havenft been altered, yes, 
that's true. 
Q. Okay, then --
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, for the 
benefit of time, we'll stipulate that these five 
exhibits are copies of her tax returns, and I think 
we've already stipulated that before. They've been 
admitted into evidence as such, and they reflect her 
income and deductions that she might be entitled to 
for each of those years. 
And for purposes of getting that before 
the Court, we so stipulate. They speak for 
themselves, and I think Counsel can argue the 
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1 documents* I can't see any reason for any further 
2 testimony. 
3 If he wants to ask questions relating to 
4 contesting how she could have had enough money to make 
5 these payments for a boat, or enough money to pay for 
6 a house, on the limited amount of income that she 
7 reported, I think he ought to get directly to the 
8 question rather than trying to lay additional 
9 foundation from the documents. 
10 THE COURT: Sustained. 
11 MR. HARTWIG: Then, I will have no 
12 further questions on this point, your Honor. 
13 And I will thank Counsel for his timely 
14 suggestion. 
15 I have no further questions, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Anything further? 
17 MR. PETERSON: Briefly, your Honor, if I 
18 may? Thank you. 
19 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
20 BY MR. PETERSON: 
21 Q. Lynette, what's your employment? 
22 A. I'm self-employed. 
23 Q. As what? 
24 A. Cosmotologist. 
25 Q. Is that sometimes referred to as a 
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1 "Wages, Salary and Tips, $26,515." Was that all 
2 Mr. Torres? 
3 THE WITNESS* I don't know. I'd have to 
4 look. 
5 THE COURTi Line 7, it reports: "Wages, 
6 Salaries and Tips of $26,515." In '87, was he the 
7 only one that was employed for an employer where he'd 
8 get a W-2? 
9 THE WITNESS: No, we were both 
10 employed. 
11 THE COURT: Well, you have a Schedule C 
12 for your "Becky's Hair Fashions." Was that --
13 THE WITNESS: That's mine. That's for 
14 me. 
15 THE COURT: Listen to my questions. 
16 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 
17 THE COURT: Was your only source of 
18 income Becky's Hair Fashions? 
19 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: In '87? 
21 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: So, the reported wages would 
23 have been all Mr. Torres'. 
24 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
25 THE COURT: 1988, "$23,969" in reported 
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1 w a g e s , that would have all been M r . T o r r e s ? 
2 THE W I T N E S S : What year? 
3 THE COURT: »88, 
4 THE W I T N E S S : I think we were separated 
5 then, w e r e n ' t we? 
6 THE C O U R T : I don't k n o w . 
7 T HE W I T N E S S : I only r e c a l l filing 
8 income tax with John one ye a r ; or was it two? 
9 THE C O U R T : It's a joint return for 
10 1 9 8 8 . W a s your only source of income B e c k y ' s Hair 
11 F a s h i o n s in 1988? 
12 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
13 THE C O U R T : The d i v o r c e was filed June 
14 16, '89? does that tell you when you se p a r a t e d ? 
15 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
16 THE C O U R T : When did you sep a r a t e ? 
17 THE WITNESS: January 14th. 
18 THE COURT: 1989? 
19 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
20 T HE C O U R T : On November 2nd, 1 9 8 9 f you 
21 appeared b e f o r e C o m m i s s i o n e r P u e l e r for a p r e t r i a l ; do 
22 you remember that? 
23 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: Do you remember what she 
2 51 recommended? 
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1 THE WITNESS: No. 
2 THE COURTi "Home to be appraised. Any 
3 equity acquired during marriage to be divided 
4 equally. Plaintiff awarded boat. Each party awarded 
5 one ring. Debt to be divided equally. Other issues 
6 settled"; is that as you recall it? 
7 THE WITNESSi Yes. 
8 THE COURT: Was there anything wrong 
9 with that? 
10 THE WITNESS: Well, there was no equity 
11 in the home. 
12 THE COURT: Was there anything wrong 
13 with that? 
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, I wanted both of the 
15 rings. They were both gifts. 
16 THE COURT: Was that the only holdup at 
17 that time? 
18 THE WITNESS: I don't recall. 
19 THE COURT: Do you recall what his 
20 position was? 
21 THE WITNESS: No, I don't. 
22 THE COURT: As far as you were 
23 concerned, the only holdup was that you wanted both 
24 rings. 
25| THE WITNESS: Yes. 
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1 doorsf locked them, and said thatfs the end of it* 
2 Q. Did you file bankruptcy? 
3 A. Yes, I did. 
4 Q. And about when was that? 
5 A. »85? Mid part of f85, if I remember 
6 correctly. 
7 Q. Okay* And after that, then, did you 
8 obtain employment? 
9 A. Yes, I did, I went to work for 
10 C.R. England & Sons, who I had worked for before. 
11 Q. When did you commence that, 
12 approximately? 
13 A. Just shortly after I closed the 
14 company. 
15 Q. And, at that point, is this around the 
16 time when you and Lynette were getting married? 
17 A. It was just a little before that time. 
18 Q. Okay. And could you please explain to 
19 the Court how you and Lynette set up or handled your 
20 joint -- excuse me, not joint -- your bills and 
21 expenses? 
22 A. Due to my problems with the IRS, which I 
23 told Lynette I had problems and which she was aware 
24 of, I did not want a checking account in my name. I 
25 didnft want anything in my name. So, when I was paid 
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1 at C.R. England -- I believe it was every Wednesday --
2 Lynette would get my check, and then it would go into 
3 her account, and I didnft have a checking account* 
l| Q. Okay* Were bills of yours paid out of 
A that checking account? 
ff A* I didnft have any bills. 
Q* Okay* Were your ongoing costs of 
l\ living, your day-to-day expenses, paid out of that 
91 account? 
10 
11 
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A. Yes* Lynette -- sometimes I'd keep some 
extra money over, and sometimes Lynette would give me 
a check; just depended on what I needed* 
Q* Okay* Now, Lynette testified to the 
fact that she remembered that you took back about half 
of your paychecks; is that correct? 
A# There might have been some instances 
when half of my paycheck came back to me, but, 
ultimately, it was her purchasing something for the 
house or something for the boat or something of that 
nature* 
Q* You mentioned additional purchases. Did 
you and Lynette purchase other things other than the 
boat and improvements to the house? 
A* Well, there was a boat* Like you said, 
there was improvements on the house; put a backyard 
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1 in. 
2 Q* Did you purchase additional items such 
3 as the refrigerator? 
4 A* Yes, we purchased a refrigerator. There 
5 was, like, Christinas gifts for the kids and Lynettefs 
6 kids, stuff like that* 
7 Q* Were there other things that were 
8 purchased for Lynette and the children that you can 
9 recall while you were together? 
10 A. Yes. One thing we purchased, and we 
11 both agreed on -- we were kind of lucky -- is we went 
12 to Wendover, and I won 1,100, $1,200. And with that 
13 money, we bought the kids bedroom sets. 
14 Q. Okay, now, if I can turn your attention 
15 to the insurance issue and the incident with the jaw. 
16 We've already indicated to the Court that there was an 
17 altercation in January of 1989; is that correct? 
18 A. Yes, sir, it is. 
19 Q* Wherein you struck Lynette, and 
20 apparently broke her — somehow fractured her jaw; is 
21 that correct? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q* Okay. At this point in time, have my 
24 representations to the Court and Counsel, as far as 
25 your responsibility, that you are willing to take 
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1 responsibility for that, has that been correct? 
2 A. Yes, it is. 
3 Q» Did you accompany Lynette or at any time 
4 meet with the physicians who were treating her for the 
5 jaw problem? 
61 A. I was up to the hospital and talked to 
7 the doctor, but, no, I really didn't meet with them. 
8 Q. Okay. Was there, to your -- well, first 
9 of all, do you remember any agreement between you and 
10 Lynette concerning carrying the insurance? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. What do you remember of that agreement 
13 to date? 
14 MR. PETERSON* Are we asking about the 
15 health insurance? 
16 MR. HARTWIG: That is correct, thank 
17 you. Counsel. 
18 THE WITNESS: Yes. We were in Judge 
19 Rigtrupfs chambers, and Lynette was present, and her 
20 attorney and myself and your co-worker, I believe, at 
21 the time, we were talking about settlement. And 
22 Lynette brought up that I broke her jaw, which the 
23 Judge turned to me and asked me if I did, and I said, 
24 "Yes, I did." Lynette said that, at that time, that 
25| due to what the doctors had told her, she needed to be 
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1 on the insurance for a year and a half. At that time, 
2 the Judge turned to me and says, "Would you leave her 
3 on the insurance for a year and a half for her jaw?11 
4 And I said, "Yes, I would." 
5 At that time, he asked if we agreed on 
6 that, and of course I said, "Yes." And after the year 
7 and a half was up, just a little over, I took her off 
81 the insurance. 
9 Q. Okay. And you were here during the 
10 testimony of Kate Blackwood, is that correct? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Do you remember her testimony concerning 
13 the costs, the additional costs to you, for carrying 
14 Lynette on your health insurance? 
15 A. Out of my paycheck every two weeks was 
16 like 34, $35. 
17 Q. And when did you sign the drop slip for 
18 removing Lynette from your health insurance? 
19 MR. PETERSONi Objection, your Honor. 
20 The document speaks for itself, and I think the people 
21 who control those documents have already indicated 
22 that it was signed on August 15th. 
23 THE COURTt Is your evidence any 
24 different than what we've seen documented? 
25 MR. HARTWIG: No. We would have no 
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1 Q* And, then# based on your manual and what 
2 you've read in the manual, when would you have 
3 expected this drop, dropping Lynette from the 
4 insurance, to have occurred? 
5 A* Well, the pay period in this check that 
6 ends 8-11-90 actually runs from, like, 7-29 of '90 to 
7 8-11 of f90* The pay date being the following 
8 Friday* It was my assumption that she would have been 
9 dropped in that time period, from 7-29 to 8-11 of 
10 '90. 
11 Q* Okay. Did you actually know that 
12 Lynette was scheduled for surgery on 8-15-90? 
13 A. No* 
14 Q* Do you have any knowledge as to whether 
15 Lynette has had any further problems with her jaw? 
16 A, According to the PEHP records that I 
17 obtained, she hadn't been back to see a doctor about 
18 her jaw* 
19 Q* And did you, as soon as you learned of 
20 the problem with the insurance, have Lynette Torres 
21 reinstated? 
22 A* Yes, I did* Since she was taken off, 
23 though, we had to go about it a little different. She 
24 had to fill out a form, which I delivered to her place 
25J of business* And she filled the form out, and then it 
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was taken up to, I guess, the insurance people for 
Salt Lake City, and then they sent it on to PEHP, if I 
remember correctly* 
Q, And did you contact the appropriate 
people at your employment to see if it would be 
possible to have this surgery taken care or covered by 
the insurance? 
A. Yes. I went over and talked to Kate and 
asked her if there was any way that they could make 
the insurance retroactive back to the date that she 
was taken off, and they said no. 
Q. Okay, at this time I'd like to take your 
attention to the boats that have been involved. You 
have claimed an interest in the 1973 Raynell boat. 
Would you please explain the basis for that claim? 
A. Due to my labor that I put in it and the 
help paying for the boat. 
Q. Did you work on the prior boat, at all? 
A. Yes, the one that belonged to a 
Mr. Peterson. 
Q. And this was the Bayliner that we are 
talking about? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay, would you please explain to the 
Court the work that you performed on the Bayliner? 
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1 stating that. 
2 MR# PETERSON: Objection, your Honor. 
3 THE COURT* Sustained. 
4 MR. HARTWIGi Okay. 
5 If I can turn your attention, now, to 
6 Lynettefs house. You claim, through your pleadings in 
7 here today, that you believe you should have a partial 
8 interest in that house. Would you please explain to 
9 the Court the basis for that claim. 
10 A. Due to the financial aid -- or the money 
11 that I put into the house and labor, my skills. 
12 Q. Would you please give the Court -- first 
13 of all, do you have a remembrance as to the work that 
14 you did in the house? 
15 A. Oh, yes. 
16 Q. Could you please tell the Court what 
17 that was. 
18 A. Well, inside the house, the basement 
19 downstairs was non-finished cement floor; half cement 
20 walls. The upper half of the walls were 2x4fs and 
21 insulation. I'd studded out all the walls, did the 
22 majority of electrical; however, we did change 
23 electrical boxes and did contract that out, because 
24 220 volt was involved in that and Ifm a little 
251 hesitant about messing with 220. 
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1 I installed the bathroom, which meant 
2 running all the plumbing for water to the sinks, the 
3 toilet, the showers, plus all the draining. Along 
4 with the purchase price, there was a corner shower 
5 that was quite expensive. Lynette and I both like 
6 nice things, and we purchased nice things. 
7 The floor in the bathroom downstairs and 
8 the laundry room and the closet and the hallway was 
9 all ceramic tile. The closet, we put cedar in the 
10 closet. And then, in the other part of the basement, 
11 put acoustics on the ceiling. 
12 THE COURT: What on the ceiling? 
13 THE WITNESS: Acoustic ceilings. 
14 Sheetrock all the walls, and then 
15 paneled them; expensive carpet on the floor. 
16 MR* HARTWIG: Okay, was there anything 
17 else? 
18 A. Yes, there was doors for the laundry 
19 room upstairs. We carpeted -- we ended up carpeting 
20 the whole house; had the upstairs -- ceramic tile to 
21 the kitchen, the entryway; put new sliding doors on 
22 the kids* bedrooms and downstairs on a closet; custom 
23 made banister; outside, put a backyard in, cement 
24 patio* 
25 Q* Okay, you heard Plaintiff's testimony 
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1 concerning the cost of materials, which was 
2 Plaintiff's Exhibit 18, being a total of $5,943. Do 
3 you have an opinion as to whether that is a fair and 
4 accurate representation for the materials involved? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q# And that opinion, is that correct, or 
7 not? 
8 A, Yes, it's pretty accurate. 
9 Q. Okay, were you working at this time? 
10 A. Yes, I was. 
11 Q. And employed full time? 
12 A. Pardon. 
13 Q. Full time? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. What shift did you work? 
16 A. Part of the time I worked at Kenworth 
17 Sales, which was day shift, and the rest of the time I 
18 worked for Salt Lake City Corporation, graveyard, 
19 which was 11:00 at night until 8:00 in the morning. 
20 Q. And you actually did some of this work 
21 on the house? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. When did you do that work? 
24 A. A lot Of times it was during the day. 
25 When I worked for the City, it was during the day. 
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1 When I worked for Kenworth Sales, it was usually in 
2 the evening and on the weekend* 
3 Q* Did Lynette help you during those times? 
41 A* Lynette pitched in and helped when she 
5 was around there. Sometimes, when I worked on it, she 
6 was at work, so it was a little difficult* But on the 
7 weekends, she*d pitch in* The kids would -- theyfd 
8 come down and help clean up and stuff, yes. 
9 Q. Do you have an opinion as to the value 
10 of the work that you put into the house? 
11 A* I guess, with parts and labor and 
12 everything --
13 MR* PETERSON: Objection, your Honor; 
14 foundation* There's nothing before the Court that 
15 indicates that Mr* Torres has any expertise in the 
16 area, other than as any other person who lives in a 
17 home and goes in and remodels or refurbishes his own 
18 home* 
19 THE COURT* For that reason, I'll let 
20 him testify. 
21 MR* PETERSON: I think we need some 
22 foundation as to what hefs basing it on. 
23 THE COURT: He did the work. 
24 MR. PETERSON: Pardon? 
251 THE COURT: Overruled. He did the work* 
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1 MR. PETERSON: Can we get an hourly 
2 rate? 
3 THE WITNESS! To clarify, Mr. Peterson, 
4 I used to build homes for Earl Walter's Construction 
5 and Glen Gilbert, sheetrocking, building homes. The 
6 last home I built was up in Idaho, or helped build as 
7 a carpenter* It was for a doctor right on the Snake 
8 River. I've had experience. 
9 MR. PETERSON: Based on that experience, 
10 I believe that he clearly has no valid opinion before 
11 the Court that he has just testified that his 
12 experience is limited to a time substantially 
13 different than the time in question and a place 
14 substantially different, in another state. 
15 THE COURT: Overruled. 
16 MR. HARTWIG: Go ahead and answer. Do 
17 you have an opinion as to what you would estimate the 
18 value of these improvements to be? 
19 A. I would estimate the value probably 
20 roughly in the neighborhood -- say, somewhere in the 
21 neighborhood of 12,000. 
22 Q* Okay, is there any other property that 
23 you claim is yours, or should be yours, that is not 
24 presently in your possession? 
25( A. Yes. When Lynette and I were married, I 
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1 THE COURT* You may cross* 
2 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
3 BY MR. PETERSON! 
4 Q. Mr. Torres, as I understood your 
5 testimony when you were in the Judge's chambers at 
6 pretrial, the Judge asked if you would continue to 
7 maintain health and accident insurance, and you agreed 
8 that you would continue to maintain health and 
9 accident insurance. That's what you testified; is 
10 that accurate? 
11 A. I only said I would continue the 
12 insurance because Lynette said for a year and a half* 
13 That's what the doctor recommended. I said that a 
14 year and a half is fine with me. The Judge asked me 
15 if that's okay. I said yes, 
16 Q* You were in front of the Judge on 
17 February 1st, 1990; do you recall that? 
18 A* In his chambers, is that what you are 
19 referring to? 
20 Q. Yes, 
21 A. Yes* 
22 Q. You terminated the insurance on August 
23 15th, 1990, that's ~ 
24 A« August the 11th between --
25 Q# You went in and signed the change card 
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1 on August 15th, 1990; is that correct? 
2 A* Yes* 
31 Q* Was that a year and a half after you 
4 were in the Judgefs chambers? 
5 A* It was a year and a half -- a little 
6 over a year and a half after the date of the broken 
7 jaw happened* 
81 Q* In reality, the reason you terminated 
9 that insurance is because you knew that Lynette was 
10 having surgery; isnft it? 
11 A. No, sir, it isn'tt 
12 Q* Mr. Torres, have you ever been convicted 
13 of a felony? 
14 A* I really donft see what that's got to do 
15 with this case* 
16 Q* It has a lot to do with your 
17 credibility, Mr* Torres* Ifm asking the question, and 
18 you are not the judge, here* 
19 Have you been convicted of a felony? 
20 A* Yes, I have. 
21 Q* Okay, and you understood, very clearly, 
22 that the agreement was to maintain insurance, and you 
23 represented to the Judge that you would do so; didn't 
24 you? 
25J A. When Lynette said for a year and a half, 
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1 I said, "Yes, I will stipulate to that." The Judge 
2 asked me if Ifd go along with that, if I had any 
3 problems with that? I said, "No, I did not have any 
4 problem with that*" A year and a half* 
5 Q. From the date of the divorce? 
6 A* From January until August, is a little 
7 over a year and a half, and that's when I took her 
8 off* 
9 Q* It was from the date of the divorce that 
10 you agreed to maintain the insurance, wasn't it? 
11 A* No, it wasn't* 
12 Q* And you went in on the day of the 
13 surgery, intentionally, and canceled that insurance, 
14 didn't you? 
15 A* No. 
16 MR* HARTWIG* Objection, your Honor* 
17 That's argumentative. 
18 THE COURT* Overruled* 
19 MR* PETERSON: This is 
20 cross-examination* 
21 THE WITNESSt The insurance — 
22 MR* PETERSONt Mr. Torres, all that 
23 requires is a "yes" or "no" answer* You went in on 
24 the day of the surgery, intentionally, and canceled 
25| that insurance; didn't you? 
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1 A* No, sir, I did not* 
2 Q# Mr* Torres, wherefs the document that 
3 shows that you had an invoice for repair on the boat? 
4 A, As I stated earlier, I don't know where 
5 it is* 
6 Q* Now, as I understand it, the boat was 
7 owned by Mr* Michael Peterson; is that correct? 
8 A* As far as I know, yes* 
9 Q. And you did $1,200 worth of work on tha 
10 boat, and billed Lynette Torres, Lynette Manske, for 
11 the work on a boat that belonged to Mr. Michael 
12 Peterson? 
13 A* Yes, that's true* 
14 Q# The $4,500 that Lynette applied to the 
15 down payment on the Raynell boat, that was, in its 
16 entirety, a loan received in repayment from Michael 
17 Peterson; wasn't it? 
18 Do you even know? 
19 A* I don't know that the loan was for 
20 Mr. Peterson; however, roughly $1,200 --
21 MR, PETERSON: Objection, your Honor. 
22 He's already testified that he doesn't know what the 
23 loan was* 
24 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do know what the 
25 loan is, because Lynette told me* 
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1 what itj is that you want? 
2 A, For my labor and the expenses I put into 
3 the home* I feel that I'm entitled to something out of 
4 it. 
5 Q* What? Cash, you mean? 
6 A* Swap, trade, whatever* 
7 Q* Did you pay rent when you lived in the 
8 home? 
9 A* Now, whose home are you talking about, 
10 mine •— 
11 Q* Lynette's. 
12 A* Did I pay rent? You mean, did I make 
13 her a monthly rent check? 
14 Q. Yes, did you do that? 
15 A* No, I give her my paycheck every two 
16 weeks* 
17 Q* Did you pay a mortgage? 
18 A* I helped with the mortgage payments, 
19 yes* 
20 Q# You think you should live there for 
21 free, or do you think that while you are living there 
22 it's appropriate, since you are married to her, to 
23 contribute to the improvement of the home and the 
24 maintenance of the home, which is your position? 
25 A. I think, according to the income tax 
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1 that we filed, it shows I contributed quite a bit. 
2 Q# I didn't ask you that. I asked you 
3 which is your position! Should you live there for 
4 free, or should you contribute to the maintenance and 
5 improvement of the home while you are living there and 
6 married to her? 
7 A. While I was living there, I did 
8 contribute to the maintenance and to the care of the 
9 home. 
10 Q* But not for free. You should be 
11 compensated, according to your testimony here today; 
12 is that correct? 
13 A. You are saying she should be 
14 compensated. Is it good enough for her, but not for 
15 me? 
16 Q. How is she being compensated? She's 
17 offered you a home; hasn't she? You can have the home 
18 and take the mortgage. That way you can get a hundred 
19 percent of your improvement value; can't you? 
20 A# Why do I want a home that still owes 
21 $11,000 more than what it is worth? 
22 Q« That's my point. How did you improve 
23 the value of this home? To what are you entitled? 
24 You didn't do anything except live there and 
25 contribute to the maintenance and improvement of the 
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1 home. That's all you did; isn't it? 
2 A. It's some pretty hard maintenance. 
3 Q. That's why we are here in court, today, 
4 because you insist on being compensated for a place 
5 where you lived; isn't that true? 
6 MR. HARTWIG: Objection, your Honor. 
7 This is argumentative* 
8 THE COURT* Sustained. 
9 MR. PETERSON: Now, as to the hearing in 
10 front of the Commissioner, when we left that hearing, 
11 you, in fact, took the position that you'd never 
12 settle the case unless you got the boat; wasn't that 
13 your position when we walked out into the hall? 
14 A. No, sir, it wasn't. 
15 Q. Did you tell Mr. Hartwigi "Let's go to 
16 trial. We'll get the boat at trial11; isn't that what 
17 you said to Mr. Hartwlg out in the hall? 
18 A. I don't believe I did, no. 
19 Q# And you refused to settle under any 
20 circumstance, under any conditions, that didn't give 
21 you the boat, at that time; isn't that accurate? 
22 A. No, we've tried to settle with you a 
23 number of times. 
24 Q. With $14,000 in cash for improvements in 
25 the house? 
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1 A. I didn't say I wanted $14,000 in cash. 
2 Q. How much did you want? 
3 A. I haven't put a dollar value on it. 
4 Q. But you've always wanted compensation 
5 and would not settle this case without compensation; 
6 isn't that accurate? 
7 A. No, sir, it is not* 
8 MR. PETERSON: I don't have any more 
9 questions, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Any redirect? 
11 MR. HARTWIG: No redirect. 
12 THE COURT: If the home were sold and 
13 resulted in a loss, would you have been willing to pay 
14 half of the loss? 
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, I would have. 
16 THE COURT: Did you offer to put the 
17 home up for sale and either take half the gain or half 
18 the loss? 
19 THE WITNESS: No, sir, I did not offer 
20 to put the home up for sale* Like I say, the home was 
21 in Lynette's name. The home is hers. I have no 
22 argument with that# All I did is make some fantastic 
23 improvements on it. 
24 THE COURT: Has she offered to let you 
25 have the home if you assumed the debt? 
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